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Abstract In the last few decades, a growing number
of theorists have suggested that the natural environ-
ment can be a platform for promoting cooperation
between former adversaries and can perhaps con-
tribute to peacebuilding. However, environmental
cooperation has not lived up to these claims. In many
cases, such cooperation has largely been ineffective
and/or inequitable. Therefore, there is a growing
awareness that we cannot be overly optimistic at the
first signs of ‘cooperation’. It is argued that this reality
results from the great complexity inherent in cooper-
ative interactions. This paper explores the nature of
such cooperation in two Israeli–Palestinian case
studies. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is one of the
longest-running protracted conflicts in the modern era
and is currently characterised by a political stalemate.
However, there is also a willingness by some at the
local level to cooperate. Therefore Israel/Palestine
provides an ideal case study. The findings of the paper
illuminate the complex nature of environmental
cooperation and reveal that even with the presence
of good intentions, cooperation at the subnational level
is impacted by the broader socio-political structures
and contexts within which it is embedded. In these
case studies, this is negatively affecting both the
nature and scale of the processes and outcomes.
Ultimately, these factors are making such interactions
limited, unstable and/or prone to collapse. The paper
concludes that only by conducting in-depth multi-
tiered and context-specific analyses of cooperative
processes and subsequently finding ways to overcome
the identified barriers can we move towards more
successful environmental cooperation.
Keywords Environment  Cooperation  Israel 
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Introduction
Alongside concerns pertaining to the emergence of
water wars and natural resource conflicts in the 21st
century, the last few decades has witnessed a surge in
academic literature expressing the potential of the
environment in facilitating cooperation and amicable
benefit-sharing between conflicting parties (Phillips
et al. 2006). Some even contend that such cooperation
can contribute to peacebuilding by spilling over from
areas of so-called low-politics (in this case the
environment) into areas of high-politics (e.g. Agges-
tam and Sundell-Eklund 2014). However, despite this
optimism, environmental cooperation/peacemaking
has not lived up to such expectations and has often
been ineffective and/or unfavourable. This paper,
recognising this issue as the product of the complexity
inherent in the nature and conduct of environmental
cooperation, seeks to problematize and unpack this
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complexity. After laying out the literary context to
which it contributes, it explores the nature of cooper-
ation in two Israeli–Palestinian cases of environmental
cooperation in the greater Bethlehem area. Such
exploration, by identifying obstacles and limitations
encountered in cooperative interactions, sets the
platform for future studies to suggest ways of
enhancing the processes and outcomes of such coop-
erative projects.
Literature review
Since the mid-1980s, in response to alarmist notions of
‘resource wars’ and environmentally induced violent
conflict that dominated environmental security liter-
ature, a more liberal counter-discourse emerged which
argued that the environment is more often an inducer
of co-operation rather than conflict, and that it could be
a potential catalyst for promoting stable rela-
tions/peacebuilding (Martin et al. 2011). Indeed, Wolf
et al. stated in (2005), that in the previous 50 years,
there had been 507 conflict-related transboundary
events over water compared to 1228 cooperative
events. They contend that ‘‘water has…been a pro-
ductive pathway for building confidence, developing
cooperation, and preventing conflict, even in particu-
larly contentious basins’’ (p. 94). Aside from negoti-
ations and signed agreements, other oft cited evidence
of the potential for environmental cooperation has
been the formation of transfrontier conservation areas
(TFCAs) or ‘Peace Parks’ (e.g. Ali 2007). Some
scholars have thus come to believe that the environ-
ment ‘‘provides a window of opportunity for cooper-
ation and coexistence between former adversaries’’
(Coskun 2009: 103). However, these transformative
views have been accused of being overly optimistic
and of being too hasty with their optimism at the first
signs of cooperation. Correspondingly, environmental
cooperation literature appears to be becoming increas-
ingly aware that not all cooperation is favourable or
effective, thus acknowledging the need to scrutinise
the nature of cooperative interactions. These realities,
I argue, stem from the complexity inherent in coop-
erative processes.
Elhance (2000) contends that, ‘‘hydropolitics by its
very nature is one of the most complex arenas of
interstate relations’’ (p. 202). This stems from the fact
that each context brings with it ‘‘unique combinations
of the geographic features of specific basins with a
multiplicity of historical, political, economic, social,
strategic and cultural factors’’ (p. 202). Within this
already complicated context, one must add the range of
self-interested actors engaged in the cooperation, each
coming to the table with their own interests and
agendas, political standings, developmental stage,
perceptions, power position and reputations (e.g. Victor
2006). In sum, cooperation faces many barriers-
strategic, political, technical and economic- that influ-
ence the capacity and willingness of actors to engage in
cooperative interactions (Elhance 2000). In light of
these factors, agreements, conventions, and river basin
organisations (RBOs) are not necessarily accurate
indicators of cooperation, as is often assumed (e.g.
Mirumachi and Allan 2007). They are often nothing
more than ‘paper tigers’, sinks for donor funds, or
regimes that preserve or further inequity (Zeitoun
2008), result in asymmetric gains, further economic
development under the rubric of promoting cooperation
at the expense of the environment (e.g. Sneddon and
Fox), andmethods which fail to have the presumed spill
over effects and thus promote broader cooperation and
dialogue at larger political and societal levels (e.g.
Carius 2006). In light of these many faces of cooper-
ation, Mirumachi (2007) outlined a 5-level scale which
assesses the intensity of cooperation in various cases.
These levels are distinguished from one another based
on the presence/absence of 4 things: joint action,
believing that the other party will contribute to
collective action, intention to contribute to collective
action, and common goals. This recognises that not all
cooperation is of equal value.
It is now also recognised that the presence of
cooperative type interactions does not automatically
mean the absence of conflict. In fact, cooperation can
be laden in conflict (Selby 2013). Zeitoun and
Mirumachi (2008) claim that:
The examination of either conflict or coopera-
tion…refutes the reality of the vast majority of
contexts where cooperation and conflict coexist,
and perpetuates the paradigm that any conflict is
‘bad’ and that all forms of cooperation are
‘good’ (p. 297).
The above statement suggests that conflict and coop-
eration are not necessarily negative and positive
respectively. Indeed, they assert that there are ‘‘less
ugly faces of conflict and less pretty faces of
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cooperation’’ (p. 299). Yet they claim that these are
overlooked, as are the political aspects of these
interactions. Cooperation, then, is not always positive.
In fact Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) claim that it
‘‘may serve to veil or perpetuate conflict’’ and may
even ‘‘deepen it’’ (p. 312). A lot of this potential for
negative ‘cooperation’ stems from the fact that it often
takes place in situations of highly asymmetrical power
and economic relations where the hydro-hegemons
can use ‘soft power’ to achieve their strategic goals at
the expense of the hegemonised (Zeitoun and Warner
2006; Mirumachi and Allan 2007). Soft power allows
powerful parties to frame inequitable cooperation in a
cooperative light (Zeitoun et al. 2011). Hence, Zeitoun
and Mirumachi (2008) encourage cooperation theo-
rists not to be too hasty in celebrating the first signs of
cooperation without first interrogating the nature of
such cooperation. According to Selby (2013), we must
ask the following questions when exploring environ-
mental cooperation: ‘‘What and whose pur-
poses…does the identification of particular
interactions as cooperation serve? And what are the
impacts of cooperation discourse, and its attendant
practices, on patterns of water inequality, insecurity
and vulnerability?’’ (p. 3). Zeitoun and Mirumachi
(2008) point out that the drivers, as well as the power
related and strategic features of such interactions, are
still underdeveloped within the literature.
The above discussion challenges the previous ten-
dency to think that ‘‘it makes sense to promote and
support cooperation of any sort no matter how slight’’
(UNDP 2006, quoted in Selby 2013: 2). At the outset of
their volume, Conca (2002) claimed: ‘‘We presume that
it is not enough just to cooperate; both the form and
content of that cooperation are critical’’ (emphasis
added p. 11). By the end of the book, the concluding
remarks indicated a consolidation of this assumption:
The case of South Asia provides us with an
important caution: …the mere existence of
cooperation is less important than the content,
scope, and orientation of that cooperation
(Conca and Dabelko 2002: 232).
Zeitoun and Mirumachi’s (2008) statement also asserts
that cooperation and conflict can occur at the same
time. Indeed, Israel/Palestine would appear to be one of
those cases in which conflict and cooperation coexist.
The conflict in the region is one of the most protracted
conflicts of the modern era, characterised by a Jewish
settler-colonial project aiming to establish a Jewish
national homeland in historic Palestine, thereby creat-
ing a long-running conflict with the native Arab
inhabitants of the region. Although a peace process
began in Oslo in 1993, it subsequently collapsed in
2000 with the eruption of the Al-Aqsa intifada (e.g.
Coskun 2009). Since that time, there has been a
political stalemate and the conflict continues. However,
whilst state-level officials still viewwater-management
as a security issue embedded within ‘high politics’, at
the same time there are local level actors willing to
cooperate on such issues (Coskun 2009). The presence
of a local willingness to cooperate makes it surprising
that previous studies of environmental cooperation
have largely looked at state-level cooperative interac-
tions. This ignores the potential contribution to bemade
by subnational actors. There has been recognition that it
is local level cooperation that requires further research
to determine whether such efforts can induce cooper-
ation on other political issues or whether they can scale
up to the state level (Ja¨gerskog 2003). Moreover, it has
been at the intra- rather than inter- state level at which
water-related violence has more commonly ensued
(e.g. Selby 2003). Therefore, cooperation could make a
significant impact at this level.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict, with its subna-
tional cases of environmental cooperation within a
broader context of political conflict, thus provides an
ideal region of study for the present paper. Two of the
subnational environmental cooperation case studies
from the greater Bethlehem region will be explored.
Through this analysis, the paper will contribute to this
still underdeveloped literature on the nature and
complexity of cooperation. It asks which elements of
complexity play out in these cases, particularly those
which undermine the processes and outcomes of the
cooperative interactions (Figs. 1, 2).
The case studies
Case study 1: EcoPeace/FoEME’s good water
neighbours (GWN) project in Wadi Fukin & Tzur
Hadassah
The Good Water Neighbours project (henceforth
GWN) began in 2001 during the height of the Al
Aqsa (Second) intifada as the flagship project of
Friends of the Earth Middle East (now and henceforth
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‘EcoPeace’). The project, which has leveraged hun-
dreds of millions of dollars, involves the selection of
neighbouring communities located on opposite sides
of the political divide (Israeli, Palestinian and Jorda-
nian) to cooperate on common water issues. Initially
the project included a total of 11 communities but it
has since expanded to include 28. The project is an oft-
cited example of successful environmental coopera-
tion/peacemaking and has received much praise and
attention (e.g. Ide 2014; Kramer 2008; The Butterfly
Effect 2014). However, most references to the project
have evaluated and analysed it at a general and broad
level. Rarely has there been an in depth analysis at the
local scale. This ignores the fact that large-scale
analysis can paint a very different picture to the reality
at smaller scales. This paper therefore focuses on one
community pairing- Wadi Fukin and Tzur Hadassah.
The case of Wadi Fukin & Tzur Hadassah
Wadi Fukin/Foquin/Fuqeen is a small village located
12 km southwest of Bethlehem and home to approxi-
mately 1200 inhabitants (PCBS 2008). The village has
faced great adversity since before the 1948 Arab–Israeli
Fig. 1 Map showing the
location of the greater
Bethlehem area (labelled








War and has a complex history. It is one of the only
Palestinian villages to have been destroyed after 1948
and subsequently rebuilt and resettled by its original
inhabitants. Since 1967, the occupation has continued to
threaten its existence. The proposed separation barrier, a
settler bypass road to the north, and the expansion of the
Israeli community of Tzur Hadassah from the west and
the Israeli settlement of Beitar Illit from the east, are
amongst the factors which threaten to leave the village
with just 10 % of its original land (Negotiation Affairs
Department, PLO 2006).
Of major concern is the impact these issues are
having/could have upon the unique ancient agricul-
tural landscape of the area, which is indigenous to this
area of the Judean Mountains (Roseman 2008). In this
ancient system, water is channelled from 11 springs
through a series of aqueducts to storage pools and
eventually to terraced agricultural fields (EcoPeace/
FoEME 2007). For a long time Wadi Fukin served as
part of the breadbasket for the Bethlehem area, with
agriculture being essential to the livelihoods of its
inhabitants. The occupation, however, is impinging
upon this landscape and the farming livelihoods it
sustains. Since the springs which feed the agricultural
lands in Wadi Fukin (the Fukin Springs) also feed the
most valuable subterranean freshwater resource in the
region, the Mountain Aquifer (which serves both
Israelis and Palestinians), preservation of the land-
scape in the Fukin Valley is also of interest to the
neighbouring middle-class Israeli community of Tzur
Hadassah (established 1960; population approx. 8000)
which lies just west of the Green Line. It is this
common interest upon which the GWN project in the
area was initiated by EcoPeace.
Wadi Fukin and Tzur Hadassah were amongst the
first communities to be paired and incorporated into
Fig. 2 Map showing the location of the case study communities within the greater Bethlehem area (source: Roseman 2008: 27—
reproduced with the permission of Ecopeace)
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the GWN project in 2001. In line with other GWN
communities, the project first engaged the youth by
working with schools to provide environmental edu-
cation programmes, joint trips and a shared summer
camp (Roseman 2008). The project then began to
focus on the threats at the watershed/regional level,
attempting to encourage activism on these issues,
amongst them, the expansion of Beitar Illit, sewage
overflow from the same settlement, and the proposal to
build the separation barrier, all of which threaten to
damage the shared water systems. During this phase,
EcoPeace began to work with local leaders and adult
residents rather than focusing solely on youth. The
activities of the GWN project in different areas are
geared towards addressing ‘Priority Initiatives’ that
are developed through cross-border meetings between
local leaders and consultations with residents in both
communities. An Ecopeace representative explained
that the idea was to get the communities to talk and
identify issues, before asking ‘‘what was common?’’ to
them both (Interview, 17th November, 2014). Two
priority initiatives have been identified in the case of
Wadi Fukin and Tzur Hadassah: ‘Cross-Border
Preservation of Terraced Landscapes’ and ‘Advancing
Sanitation Solutions’ (EcoPeace/FoEME 2013).
Activities conducted under the auspices of the GWN
project include the creation of a Neighbour’s Path in
each community which aims to educate members of
both communities on their mutual dependence on
shared environmental resources, joint hazard mapping
tours which identify and map environmental issues
and aid in the development of cooperative solutions
(EcoPeace/FoEME 2012), as well as joint land use
planning for the watershed via workshops involving
residents from both communities (these meetings
where supplemented by the involvement of the Israeli
Society for the Protection of Nature (SPNI) and Israeli
planners/architects). The latter culminated in the
development of a master plan for the watershed
(Roseman 2008). Moreover, some Tzur Hadassah
residents learned that the EcoPeace was encouraging
sustainable farming techniques (e.g. not using pesti-
cides etc.) in Wadi Fukin. Since then about 25 families
from Tzur Hadassah have been buying weekly allot-
ments of the organic produce from Wadi Fukin
(Fishkoff 2010). Additionally, Tzur Hadassah resi-
dents have also approached numerous Israeli author-
ities on behalf of their Palestinian neighbours. An
example involved an attempt to get Beitar Illit to
resolve the issue of sewage flowing from the settle-
ment into the valley. Tzur Hadassah residents have
also arranged meetings with the housing ministry in an
attempt to stop the development of two new neigh-
bourhoods in Tzur Hadassah within the watershed
(Roseman 2008).
Since protecting the landscape of the area has been
a key aim of the GWN project in Wadi Fukin and Tzur
Hadassah, a major activity of the project has been to
challenge the proposed separation barrier. It is the
challenge to the barrier which is of particular interest
to this article since it is the one which has led to the
eventual degradation of cooperative efforts between
the two communities. In June 2005, EcoPeace organ-
ised a joint tour for residents of the two communities
which explored the proposed barrier route. Joint action
against the structure ensued. Multiple cross-border
meetings to discuss the issue took place (see e.g.
Silverman 2010; Wilson 2007) in addition to a joint
tree-planting ceremony on the barrier’s proposed route
(EcoPeace/FoEME 2007). Residents of Tzur Hadas-
sah also conducted a petition at the local mini-market
which received 300 signatures from inhabitants of the
town. Some Tzur Hadassah residents also went to
discuss the barrier with Danny Tirza (head of the
military body in charge of planning the barrier’s route)
(Interview, Tzur Hadassah residents, 5th November,
2014). Furthermore, EcoPeace hired a lawyer and
began to prepare a legal challenge. Significantly, the
legal challenge did not take the familiar human rights
route. Instead, the case was made on environmental
grounds. This was the first time a legal challenge to the
separation barrier was environmentally based (e.g.
Fishkoff 2010). To strengthen the case, three environ-
mental professionals from Tzur Hadassah (an
employee of SPNI, a hydrologist and a geologist)
prepared two reports, one exploring the impact on the
landscape and the other examining the hydrological
ramifications (Interview, Tzur Hadassah resident, 5th
November, 2014). In the end, according to a repre-
sentative of EcoPeace, the case did not actually have to
go to court and for the meantime the petitioning and
campaigning has been successful in halting the
construction of the barrier (Interview, 17th November,
2014).
The GWN project in Tzur Hadassah and Wadi
Fukin has received much praise including from former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter (see Eldar 2009). It has
also been deemed an example of how cooperation over
GeoJournal
123
water issues can spill over into other issues e.g. the
separation barrier (e.g. Kramer 2008). Indeed, the
author’s own interviews revealed that the Israeli
activists also took action in attempt to help their
Palestinian partners with travel restrictions in relation
to medical treatment and employment (Interviews
November 5th, 2014; see also Fishkoff 2010). How-
ever, when the author visitedWadi Fukin in November
2014, members of the community who had previously
been involved in the GWN project indicated that they
would no longer participate. The reason given was the
ongoing expansion of Tzur Hadassah onto land
adjacent to Wadi Fukin where the separation barrier
was planned. One resident stated that ‘‘Now I call it
[Tzur Hadassah] a settlement because this part is built
on the fields of Wadi Fukin’’ (Interview, 29th
November, 2014). He highlighted the disappointment
of the GWN activists inWadi Fukin when they noticed
the expansion: ‘‘We thought we had been deceived.
We felt that they were mainly preparing to have room
for the settlement…In general we feel that there is a
Zionist plan’’. He even went as far as to say: ‘‘If the
wall had been built, it would have been much better’’
because they would have lost less land. He proceeded
to state that cooperation has now stopped and that
‘‘recently, if there was anything, it is at the individual
level’’. He claimed that ‘‘now, if youmention the name
of Tzur Hadassah, the people [of Wadi Fukin] would
be angry…people think we [the GWN activists from
Wadi Fukin] are making normalization with the
settlers’’ (Interview, 29th November, 2014). How
then could this ‘‘intimate experiment in cross-cultural
cooperation’’ (Wilson 2007, para 6), that had been
hailed a success, go so wrong so quickly? The
forthcoming evaluation will hopefully shed some light
on this question. First, the second case study will be
outlined.
Case study 2: Settler-Palestinian cooperation?—
the Kfar Etzion Field School
The story of environmental cooperation in the greater
Bethlehem region does not end with Israelis and
Palestinians cooperating across the Green Line as in
the case of Wadi Fukin and Tzur Hadassah. The media
has reported that Israeli settlers from the Kfar Etzion
Field School have also developed cooperative rela-
tions with Palestinians in nearby villages. Once again,
one of the issues this apparent cooperation has centred
upon is the proposed separation barrier. Objections to
the structure have surfaced amongst Israeli settlers
residing in the Gush Etzion bloc. Apparently, this has
given rise to a ‘‘rare coalition’’ or ‘‘unlikely hodge-
podge’’ of Palestinians, settlers, developers and envi-
ronmentalists, all opposed to the state-sponsored
project (Miller 2014, para 4). The environmentalists
on the settler side come in the form of the Kfar Etzion
Field School (an organisation which conducts field
trips and tours that aim to educate Jews on the history
and environment of the Judean region). The field
school has apparently undertaken numerous activities
of cooperation with neighbouring Palestinians to
challenge the barrier. For example, on Tu Bishvat,
the Jewish new year of the trees, the field school held a
conference in Kfar Etzion to discuss their opposition
to the separation barrier and invited along a Palestinian
guest from Husan, to talk about the impacts that the
structure would have upon Palestinian agriculture. A
member of the field school said that the same
Palestinian guest was also invited to speak on one of
the school’s tours that aimed to show settlers the
consequences of the proposed barrier (Interview, 25th
November, 2014; see also Schwartz 2014). Moreover,
Yaron Rosenthal (head of the field school) led a
successful legal battle between 2004 and 2006 to
reroute part of the barrier at Gush Etzion, apparently
cooperating with Palestinians from Wadi Fukin in the
process (Mandel 2010). In 2010, Rosenthal issued an
invitation to all those within the region, Jews, Arabs
and Christians to participate in a joint march in the
village of Walaje when construction of the barrier
began there (Mandel 2010). The field school has also
backed the UNESCO designation of the ancient
agricultural terraces at Battir as a World Heritage site,
in order to avoid what Rosenthal claims would be
‘‘tremendous environmental damage’’ (quoted in
Lewis 2014, para 7). Cooperation between Palestini-
ans and the field school has apparently not ended with
the separation barrier. Much like in the Wadi Fukin-
Tzur Hadassah case, farmers from Wadi Fukin have
asked staff of the field school to help them with
environmental hazards emanating from the nearby
settlement of Beitar Illit. In one of these instances,
staff from the field school went to Wadi Fukin to
photograph the damage caused by sewage flows from
the settlement. Rosenthal then wrote a letter to the
environmental representative of the Israeli Civil
Administration. His words appear to reflect
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sympathies with the Palestinian farmers and indicate
ongoing cooperation and good relations with them:
As one who grew up on a kibbutz whose living is
based on agriculture and spent a lot of time
working in fields and groves, I understand the
farmers’ frustration, after they put all their
money and energy in sowing and planting and
then lost their entire crop because of Betar’s
negligence…The instructors of Kfar Etzion field
school bring thousands of hikers to the village
every year, guiding them among the orchards
and fields, the springs and ponds in the wadi and
enjoying the residents’ generous hospitality
(quoted in Rinat 2013, para 8).
Unsurprisingly, some media sources have taken
interest in this rare case with numerous optimistic
headlines and statements emerging from their articles.
Schwartz (2014) is one such commentator who sums
up this optimism:
[T]his small group of settlers and Palestinians
have put aside their stereotypical roles, and come
together for an unlikely collaboration against the
Israeli government. The same government that
promotes settlements, and is building the secu-
rity barrier to protect settlers from Palestinian
attacks, is quite ironically being opposed by
settlers who are joining hands with their Pales-
tinian neighbours (para 15).
While it is common to see Jewish Israelis joining
Palestinians in their struggles, these Israelis are
almost always left wing, non-settlers. This
collaboration may very well be the first of its
kind - where Jewish settlers and Palestinians are
working together for the common cause of
opposing the Israeli government (para 16).
Reports on the case have very much painted a
picture of settlers and Palestinians cooperating based
on a shared love of the environment and a sympathy on
the part of the field school towards the concerns of
Palestinian farmers. For instance, after speaking with
members of the field school and attending one of their
conferences, Schwartz (2014) claimed that the organ-
isation’s team ‘‘believe that just as strong convictions
and a fierce love of this land can inspire hatred against
the other side, so too can these passions unite people
and plant the seeds of peace’’. It was also claimed that
the field school’s ‘‘main qualms were that the fence
would cut through the land of their Palestinian
neighbours in Wadi Fukin, Battir and Husan’’ (para
2). Indeed, in interviews the author had with residents
of Tzur Hadassah for the first case study, there seemed
to be an agreement that the field school was genuinely
concerned from an environmental and human rights
stance. One interviewee claimed that Rosenthal is
‘‘unusual among settlers’’, that ‘‘[h]e’s very sensitive
to moral issues’’ and ‘‘wants to avoid human rights
violations of the farmers’’ (Interview, 5th November,
2014). However, this optimism may be misplaced
since despite the issuing of invitations to Palestinians
to take part in joint actions, the field school has had
limited success in persuading them to participate (e.g.
Mandel 2010). Where the Palestinians have chosen to
engage with the settlers, it appears to only be in order
to ask them to do things for them rather than engaging
in joint activities. These issues, together with the
emerging warnings to avoid taking cooperation at face
value and the fact that general settler objections to the
barrier in Gush Etzion are based on concerns over
limiting settlement expansion, losing areas of the
‘promised land’, and being left outside Israel (e.g.
Mandel 2010; Miller 2014), there is a need for a more
in-depth exploration of the nature of this cooperation.
The forthcoming section will do this for the two case
studies that have just been outlined.
Discussion/evaluation of the nature of cooperation
By now it should be recognised that there is a need to
interrogate the nature of cooperative interactions. As
Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008) point out, the drivers,
power-related and strategic features require careful
consideration when analysing cooperation. These
features shall be discussed for the case studies that
have just been outlined. The discussion will then
explore the scale of the impacts for the two cases to see
if they have made any progress towards the goal of
expanding the cooperation horizontally and vertically.
Finally the cooperation intensity shall be assessed
using the 5-level scale created by Mirumachi (2007).
Drivers, power-related and strategic features
In exploring the drivers, power-related and strategic
features, what is essentially being analysed is the
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motives behind the cooperative interactions. The
general theory in the literature is that cooperative
interactions develop out of common interests, in this
case, the environment. However, Victor (2006) chal-
lenges such assumptions, arguing that such ideas are
built on an ‘‘unrealistic vision of politics’’ (p. 94). He
claims that in reality ‘‘there is a whole range of
interests and objectives [and that] the only area where
they are likely to coincide is in avoiding obviously
extreme scenarios’’ (p. 94). This prompts us to ask
whether cooperation in the two case studies is really
based on genuine common concern for the environ-
ment and human rights, as has been depicted in the
media.
The first point relating to motives is that it appears
to be the already converted or those who are prone to
dialogue/already persuaded that are involved in these
activities. This lack of ‘representativeness’ is a
common problem with initiatives which bring two
conflicting sides together. (e.g. De Vries and Maoz
2013). Lack of representativeness means that the
actors involved don’t represent the political main-
stream of their communities. Therefore, there is an
ideological gap between co-operators and their
broader communities that limits their potential as
agents of change when they return to those commu-
nities. Hence, the scale of cooperation/peacebuilding
activities is constrained. One Tzur Hadassah resident
put this clearly when he stated ‘‘the people who are
most involved are people who are more aware of
human rights, more conscientious, who identify with
the victims’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014). Indeed
this sentiment was echoed in other interviews with
Tzur Hadassah residents when they talked about their
areas of employment: ‘‘That’s what I’m doing in
everyday life…educating on democracy and peace’’
(Interview, 5th November, 2014). Another indicated
that their job in a hospital ‘‘provided a window to
Palestinian life’’ and presented ‘‘a normal bubble in
the middle of abnormality’’ (Interview, 5th November,
2014). Significantly, when asked if the GWN project
between the two communities made them like a
normal bubble in the middle of the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, it was claimed that it doesn’t due to the small
minority that are involved. Furthermore, one intervie-
wee claimed that whilst ‘‘it really helped to have the
backing from an organisation, doing all the adminis-
trative things…I would do what I do anyhow’’
(Interview, 5th November, 2014). Nevertheless, the
role of EcoPeace in stimulating this cooperation
should not be underestimated as the same resident
who made this comment was introduced to the
environmental problems underpinning the GWN
campaigns during an EcoPeace tour. Another Tzur
Hadassah resident, despite working in the arena of
peace and democracy, claimed that prior to the GWN
project they ‘‘didn’t have the same relationship with
people from the village [of Wadi Fukin]’’, and she
claimed the project was initially greeted with ‘‘lots of
hesitations on both sides’’. Significantly, she stated:
‘‘I’m not sure I would have the ability to make first
contact’’, adding that ‘‘we didn’t have information
about the situation’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014).
Again, at the very least, the catalyst role of EcoPeace
is clearly evident.
The already persuaded nature of participants can
also be seen in the second case study. For example, a
member of the main Palestinian family involved in
cooperation with the settler field school is also
involved in the Heaven’s Field Organic Farm project,
a small joint settler-Palestinian organic business
project that is sponsored by Eretz Shalom (a peace
movement promoting dialogue between settlers and
Palestinians). Moreover, the same actor is also one of
the main stars in an upcoming documentary film
entitled ‘A Third Way: Settlers and Palestinians as
Neighbours’. Furthermore, Yaron Rosenthal, head of
the Kfar Etzion field school, as indicated previously
(when outlining the second case study), is seemingly
somewhat unusual amongst the settler community in
his apparent concern for Palestinian human rights. In
fact, he also has networks with the settler peace
movement Eretz Shalom (see Mandel 2010).
In both case studies, the motivations for the
Palestinian actors were based on concern for main-
taining and protecting their land and water resources
(which they depend on for survival) from threats posed
by the occupational regime. Another motivation for
the Palestinian actors in the two cases was the strength
that Israeli participation brought to their campaigns. In
this regard, the Palestinian activists often spoke of how
the Israeli activists had the power to influence Israeli
decision-makers. Therefore, they ask the Israeli
activists to approach Israeli municipalities, authorities
etc. on their behalf. This is an interesting reflection of a
counter-hegemonic strategy being employed by the
weaker party (Palestinian villagers) in the form of
strategic cooperation (with sympathetic neighbouring
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Israeli actors) to challenge the hegemons (settlers and
Israeli decision-makers) (e.g. Casca˜o and Zeitoun
2010). Nachum Pachenik of Eretz Shalom, speaking
on a possible joint march between the Kfar Etzion field
school and Palestinians from Walaje, stated that:
‘‘[t]hey [the local Palestinians] understand that our
participation would constitute a far more powerful
statement than a leftist group taking part in any kind of
demonstration against the [security barrier]’’ (Mandel
2010, para 11). In sum, the Palestinian motivation is
clearly to protect their natural resources and their
livelihoods, with evidence of some power-related
strategic features being employed to achieve this ends.
Now the paper turns to look at the motivations of
the Israeli actors. An external evaluation, referring
specifically to Tzur Hadassah participants, claimed
that the main motivation for these Israelis was to
support the rights and livelihoods of their Palestinian
neighbours (The Butterfly Effect 2014). Indeed, a
resident of Tzur Hadassah recognised and supported
the importance of agriculture to his Palestinian
neighbours by acknowledging that it is ‘‘their way of
maintaining ownership of their land’’ (Interview, 5th
November, 2014). Another went to her municipality to
try and persuade them to implement an easier border-
crossing process for Palestinian workers. She also
acknowledged that the freeze they managed to achieve
on the decision of the barrier, whilst good in some
regards, must also be hard for ‘‘people looking for
justice… [because they]…have to wait such a long
time’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014). The interests
of the Israeli and Palestinian parties in case study one
could thus be considered closely aligned. However, it
should be noted that in the petition circulated by
residents of Tzur Hadassah, the 300 signatories had
interests which deviated from the common interest
discourse of the GWN project. One Tzur Hadassah
resident spoke about how the signatories’ reasons for
signing the petition varied.Whilst indeed ‘‘some [were
concerned] for environmental issues, [and] others for
violation of human rights’’, others were motivated by
concerns that it ‘‘would make security worse… [by]
creating tension and friction’’ (Interview, 5th Novem-
ber, 2014). The latter is obviously an issue of self-
interest and fear, and was echoed by some of the Tzur
Hadassah GWN activists themselves. One activist,
speaking about the tension she believed the barrier
would create, claimed that: ‘‘The wall doesn’t give me
any feeling of security… [It] is the opposite of
security’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014). This fear
was also echoed by some of the members of the Kfar
Etzion field school in case study two. A member of
staff at the field school, referring to the current levels
of trouble with their Palestinian neighbours, stated:
‘‘[There is] nothing, it’s quiet, [but] if [Israelis] say,
[we are] building a fence…now they will start to throw
a lot of stones etc.’’ He encourages proponents of the
barrier to change their minds so that they ‘‘don’t turn
all this area into a big fight’’. Significantly, he
indicated that the argument they use to dissuade
settler proponents of the barrier is that the second
intifada problem with terrorists has largely been
replaced with rockets, a threat which a fence cannot
prevent. They claim therefore that in building the
fence, the Israeli government is ‘‘get[ting] organized
for the war they finished, not the next war’’ (Interview,
25th November, 2014). They also tell barrier propo-
nents that they can have ‘‘as many cameras as
[they]…want’’. Apparently, that way they ‘‘won’t
damage the area…and… [will] save money’’ (Inter-
view, 25th November, 2014).
The field school may also be predisposed to
cooperation given their apparent ecological and
preservationist stance. Schwartz’s (2014) report on
the cooperation involving the field school would
indicate that this is the case (see section outlining case
study two). For example, one representative of the
field school when expressing their concern regarding
the threat the barrier posed to the unique landscape of
the area stated:
Most people at Gush Etzion only look at politics,
it’s not good…[In] the eyes of the school, it’s an
important area to preserve…We’re not a politics
group. We look at it like, we like the nature, we
know the history of the area…This is our culture,
we can’t throw it to the garbage…same for
Arabs, it’s their culture (Interview, 25th Novem-
ber, 2014).
The rather nationalist discourse held by the field
school in relation to the landscape of the area is
another point worth mentioning in terms of their
motivation to cooperate. One member of staff from the
field school spoke of the terraced landscape of the
Palestinian villages in the area and said that such
landscapes existed all over Israel before the Romans,
since the days of Abraham, the Bible and the Second
Temple. He claimed that this is what made this
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landscape so important. He also spoke of a site called
Sataf where the Jewish National Fund (JNF) is
reconstructing such a landscape in order to do
everything as it was done in ancient times. On this
point, he claimed Palestinians living on these terraced
areas ‘‘don’t know the techniques as good as before’’
and he stated that the young go to work elsewhere,
thereby threatening the future of these landscapes.
Moreover, he expressed concern about the threat the
barrier poses to the preservation of potential archae-
ological areas. For instance, he pointed out that the
landscape around Battir was the site where the
Rebellion of Bar Kochva leader sat. The rebellion
finished with big damage for the Jews, but the
interviewee claimed that it was a very important
period in Israeli history. Significantly, he seemed
concerned about the willingness or capacity of Pales-
tinians in the area to deal appropriately with any
possible archaeological heritage:
If [they] build [a] fence here, [they] will leave it
at the side of the Palestinians. [This is] not a
problem… [but they] will dig it and will ruin it…
[We] don’t know what they will find… [This is]
a famous story for Israel, we want it to be by us.
The preceding points suggest that the interests of
the Israeli and Palestinian actors are divergent in some
respects, particularly in case study two. However, it is
also clear from the discussion so far that the overar-
ching concern for the activists is preservation of the
environment, even if the reasons behind wanting to
preserve it are different. Therefore, there is still a
common broad goal. Notable also is that the Israeli
actors in both cases seem to possess a respect for the
human rights of their Palestinian neighbours, recog-
nising their right to exist on their lands, and acknowl-
edging the fact that Palestinian culture is bound up in
the same landscape as theirs. Significantly, in peace
research, it has been indicated that the aim of peace
and reconciliation is not about the elimination of
difference, but about creating mutual respect, a factor
which seems to have been largely achieved in both
case studies, at least initially. A few possible excep-
tions exist amongst the Palestinian parties in the
second case study (beyond the one main family
mentioned previously) who ‘cooperate’ only to har-
ness the power afforded by Israeli involvement, whilst
still holding on to views that the settlement is illegal
and that the intentions of the settler field school are
negative. Notably though, this mutual respect also
appears to have faded amongst the Palestinian activists
at Wadi Fukin since the expansion of Tzur Hadassah
following the freezing of the separation barrier project.
The activists now refer to Tzur Hadassah as a
settlement, suggesting its illegality and lack of a right
to exist in light of its encroachment towards Pales-
tinian land. Importantly, many of the Israeli activists
expressed discontent with the sprawling of their town.
However, because Ecopeace is still unaware of the
collapse of the project in the two communities, this has
not been communicated to the Palestinian actors who
instead assume that the expansion was the goal of their
Israeli partners. One Tzur Hadassah activist even
suggested that ‘‘maybe it was not such a good idea to
prevent the barrier in this area’’ because it leaves Wadi
Fukin residents ‘‘feeling…that they are sur-
rounded…[and] squeezed between the two Jewish
communities’’ (Beitar Illit and Tzur Hadassah). He
claimed that they would like to oppose the construc-
tion but at present they have no grounds to do so
because ‘‘so far, it doesn’t go beyond the 67’ border’’
(Interview, 5th November, 2014).
In sum, it would appear that the two case studies
consist of actors who all possess the same goal of
protecting the environment, whatever their reasons for
pursuing this goal may be. Are there any issues with
divergent motivations for pursuing that common goal
if divergent motivations are deemed a natural part of
cooperative interactions? After all, it has been sug-
gested that cooperation is so intimately tied to the
existence of conflict that it can only exist where there
is a mix of complementary and conflicting interests
(Phillips et al. 2006). The answer to this question
probably lies in the commonly touted key element for
successful cooperation- ‘mutual benefits’, as well as
the essential principle of conflict management- ‘do no
harm’. In the two cases studies, these two elements
have not been fully achieved.
The most obvious case is the expansion of Tzur
Hadassah towards Wadi Fukin after the halting of the
separation barrier. In another instance, the Kfar Etzion
field school were campaigning against the barrier in a
forested area. Their petition to the High Court resulted
in a new route being drawn up, one which threatened
more Palestinian agricultural lands (Matar 2012). The
signing of Tzur Hadassah activists’ separation barrier
petition by some people who were not concerned with
the environment or the travails of their Palestinian
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neighbours, and the security argument given to non-
cooperating Israelis by the Kfar Etzion Field School
may also be problematic when it comes to mutual
benefits and doing no harm. This is because these
elements do not challenge the ‘us versus them’
rhetoric so engrained into Israel-Palestinian society.
At worst, it may further entrench the already deep
rooted fear, blame, mistrust and harmful ideologies
that pervade the two societies and sustain the conflict.
Moreover, the Kfar Etzion field school’s narrative
surrounding the environment, whilst indicating their
love for the landscape they share with their Palestinian
neighbours, at times comes close to reinforcing the
Zionist eco-imaginary that enforces a greater Israeli
claim over the environment and superior environmen-
tal sensitivity relative to Palestinians (see Boast 2012).
In some respects it also furthers the problematic Israeli
discourse that views Palestinians as having a lack of
work ethos and of being underdeveloped and inca-
pable (e.g. Gerber 2003). There are ample examples
where the environment, in the form of tree planting,
the designation of national parks, and the creation of
archaeological areas has been used as a means of land
confiscation by the Israeli state. The field school thus
needs to be careful that their environmental narrative
does not facilitate actions which harm their Palestinian
neighbours in any way. For example, their concern for
archaeology led one member of staff to claim that
perhaps a park should be constructed in the area to
preserve it. Whilst he believed that ‘‘everyone has
good things from that’’ (Interview, 25th November,
2014), the history of Israeli national park designation
reveals that this would not be the case should the idea
be implemented by those whose intentions are not so
well-meaning. Another point to consider under the
principle of ‘do no harm’ is whether cooperation with
Israeli settlers legitimizes the presence of the illegal
settlements with the Palestinian territories, thereby
causing the Palestinians to consent to their own
colonization. Selby (2013) claims that the Israeli–
Palestinian Joint Water Committee has had such an
effect. In order to ensure that this is not the case, the
goals and desired outcomes of joint action should be
clearly specified and agreed upon by both parties, and
the motives of the actors scrutinized. This ensures that
only mutually beneficial outcomes result and that the
cooperation is based only upon specific issues (in this
case, the need to preserve the environment), thereby
meaning that the cooperative activities are not an
intention to consent to or a means to further a divisive
and asymmetrical politics. In peacebuilding literature,
Lederach (1997) states: ‘‘We should operate on the
basis of being acutely aware of the consequences of
our aid on local conflicts that we can avoid doing
harms and aggravating the conflicts through our
otherwise good intentions’’ (Lederach 1997: 91). He
goes further: ‘‘Under conditions of structural violence,
many people who behave as good citizens and who
think of themselves as peace-loving people’’, may, in
line with the theories of Galtung, participate in
‘‘settings within which individuals may do enormous
amounts of harm to other human beings without ever
intending to do so, just [by] performing their regular
duties as a job defined in the structure’’ (Lederach
1997: 7).
By not challenging and in some instances coming
close to matching the dividing dominant discourse that
reinforces cleavages between Israelis and Palestinians,
coupled with unintended non-mutually beneficial
outcomes, the two instances of cooperation have not
been able to significantly build trust, a factor which is
essential to reaching the full potential of cooperation.
They have also been affected by the broader societal
structures, politics, narratives and ideologies within
which they are embedded. This undermines their
chances of success, the scale of their impacts, and their
peacebuilding potential. The scale of the impacts is an
issue to which the paper now turns.
Scale of impact (horizontal and vertical)
Within the field of environmental cooperation/peace-
building, it is hoped that cooperation over environ-
mental issues and the realization of mutual benefits
will foster a trust that encourages cooperation on
broader issues and at larger scales (e.g. Aggestam and
Sundell-Eklund 2014; Phillips et al. 2006). That is, it is
hoped that the impacts of cooperation will be scale-up
both horizontally and vertically.
It has already been noted that the lack of represen-
tativeness of the participants inhibits the scale of the
impacts. Added to this issue is the fact that the number
of people involved is extremely small. A member of
EcoPeace acknowledged this by claiming that the
numbers involved in the GWN project in Wadi Fukin
and Tzur Hadassah are ‘‘not thousands… [but rather] a
core group of activists’’ (Interview, 17th November,
2014). This is also highlighted in the words of a Wadi
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Fukin resident: ‘‘Not all the residents of Tzur Hadas-
sah are working with us, only about four of them’’,
(Wilson 2007, ‘How Do We Trust?’ para 15). A
resident from Tzur Hadassah estimated that there were
about 20 people involved in the cooperation, and that
even amongst this minority, ‘‘they are not all involved
at the same level’’. She went on to state that most
residents of Tzur Hadassah are ‘‘indifferent’’ and
‘‘don’t want to get involved’’ (Interview, 5th Novem-
ber, 2014). When interviewing a member of the Kfar
Etzion field school, it was clear that the numbers
involved were also limited in the second case study,
and seemingly evenmore so than in the first case. Most
activities in this second case study were characterised
by the involvement of one particular family from the
village of Husan.
Related to the small numbers obstacle and also
inhibiting the scale of impact of the two case studies is
the presence of what is referred to in peacebuilding
literature as the ‘re-entry problem’. The re-entry
problem means that the scale of peacebuilding/coop-
eration impacts is limited because the small number of
cooperating actors are unable to challenge the beliefs
of the majority (who oppose change) upon return to
their communities (e.g. see De Vries and Maoz 2013).
Tzur Hadassah activists despite being a minority
within their community, stated that: ‘‘nobody pro-
tested’’ and ‘‘nobody is against it’’. However, the re-
entry problem is still clearly evident since they
claimed that the majority of their community are
‘‘indifferent’’ and ‘‘don’t want to get involved’’
(Interviews, 5th November, 2014). Significantly, the
consequences for Palestinians engaging in such coop-
erative activities is much harsher. Apparently Wadi
Fukin is a village ‘‘where many view those who work
with the Israelis as collaborators…[These people are]
often the targets of the armed groups in the Palestinian
territories’’ (Wilson 2007, para 32). This issue stems
from the dominant discourses of distrust, siege and
threat towards the ‘other’ that pervade Israeli–Pales-
tinian society. Fro¨hlich (2012) claims that it is only
through counter-discourses (like those of the actors in
these case studies) and expanding what is ‘sayable’
that these conflict discourses can be challenged. The
disapproval of non-cooperating Palestinians is there-
fore a significant obstacle for the cooperative efforts. It
discourages increased participation and encourages
existing actors to remain quiet about their cooperative
work. When talking to Israeli settlers on a tour about
the problems Palestinians faced, one Palestinian who
cooperates with the Kfar Etzion field school was
accused by Palestinian onlookers of being a betrayer
and of working with the Israeli secret police (Inter-
view, staff member of the Kfar Etzion Field School,
25th November, 2014; see also Mandel 2010). As
mentioned in the outline of case study one, Wadi
Fukin GWN activists are accused by members of their
own community of making normalization with the
settlers. This situation has worsened following the
expansion of Tzur Hadassah after the halting of the
separation barrier, because it is perceived to reflect the
non-cooperating villagers’ fears that this was the
motive behind Tzur Hadassah activists’ opposition to
the structure (e.g. Wilson 2007). Whilst it is acknowl-
edged that ‘‘[o]f course there is still good people on
that side [and]…we appreciate that’’, Wadi Fukin
activists claim that it this is ‘‘difficult to explain to the
people [of Wadi Fukin]’’ (Interview, 29th November,
2014). As a result, the already small number of
activists in the village has dwindled even further.
Many of them no longer want to engage in cooperative
activities because they feel betrayed.
As for the horizontal scaling up of activities (i.e.
spilling into other issues-political, economic etc.),
there are some positive elements in the case of Tzur
Hadassah and Wadi Fukin. Some of the Israeli
activists have taken actions to help their Palestinian
partners with travel restrictions in relation to medical
treatment and employment (Interviews November 5th,
2014). As one example, a Tzur Hadassah activist tried
to get her council to help with easing the movement
restrictions on Palestinian workers in the mornings.
However, this idea collapsed with the onset of unrest
in Gaza. However, the interviewee intends to try again
once the situation calms down (Interview, 5th Novem-
ber 2014). In the second case study, there was no
evidence that environmental cooperation has spilled
over into other issues.
Ultimately, it seems that in both case studies, the
cooperation is characterised by a small number of
individuals, who, given their context and perspective,
are already predisposed to cooperative tendencies.
Indeed, this is probably what has allowed such
cooperation to flourish. However, these characteristics
also constrain the positive impacts of the cooperation
to a very small scale and limit its peacebuilding
capacity. Some scholars (e.g. Victor 2006) contend
that smaller numbers can be better than larger
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membership due to the complexity added by each
actor and the potential for small-scale cooperation to
expand and deepen over time. However, these claims
refer to the interstate level. Small numbers and non-
representativeness are a problem at the community
level (as with the present case studies) where the goal
is to scale up environmental cooperation/peacebuild-
ing to the larger scales (municipal, governmental and
international levels) and into broader spheres (i.e.
political, economic and social issues instead of just
environmental ones). The re-entry problem is also
limiting the potential impacts of the cooperation. Like
the previous section, the above discussion illustrates
how the larger context of occupation and ethno-
nationalist conflict inhibits the scaling-up of impacts
and therefore the potential success of environmental
cooperation between adversaries.
Cooperation intensity
On Mirumachi’s (2007) scale, cooperation intensity is
assessed based on the presence or absence of four
factors: joint action, common goals, intention to
contribute to collective action and a belief that the
other party will contribute to collective action (Miru-
machi and Allan 2007). The paper has already explored
the last three factors, having looked for the presence of
common goals, examined the intentions (drivers/mo-
tives), and explored the level of trust. It was found that
there does seem to be a common broad goal of
preserving the environment but with varying reasons
for wanting to do so (motives). It was also found that
the context of ethno-nationalist conflict and occupation,
as well as the inability to uphold the principles of
‘mutual benefits’ and ‘do no harm’, means that trust has
not been adequately built, and that fear and suspicion
prevail. The nature of the activities (corresponding to
the joint action element of the cooperation intensity
scale) will now be examined so that the cooperation
intensity of the cases studies can be determined.
In both cases, many of the joint activities were
conducted on a one-off basis (e.g. tours; cross-border
meetings; conferences). This makes it difficult to
develop sustainable long-term relationships. Indeed,
the desire for follow-ups in order to maintain
relationships was one element noted by participants
in an external evaluation of the GWN project (The
Butterfly Effect 2014), and was one of the limitations
of the project noted by Kramer (2008). The author was
informed in multiple interviews with Tzur Hadassah
and Wadi Fukin residents that the GWN project in the
area was now over. For example, a resident of Tzur
Hadassah spoke of how they now have very little
connection with EcoPeace but indicated that they
could approach the organisation if they had any
problems. Importantly, Tzur Hadassah residents
expressed a willingness ‘‘to maintain some connec-
tion’’ with their Palestinian neighbours. One resident
stated that: ‘‘Now because we’re not very active, we
want to keep the relationship’’ (Interview, 5th Novem-
ber, 2014). In the case ofWadi Fukin participants, they
claimed the project had finished because they were no
longer willing to participate in light of the expansion
of Tzur Hadassah after the freezing of the separation
barrier. When posed to a member of staff at Ecopeace,
she was surprised that the Israeli participants thought
the project was over and indicated that, officially at
least, it was still ongoing. She believed that the issue
arises from the lack of funding afforded to adult
projects relative to youth projects (Interview, 17th
November, 2014). In the case of the Kfar Etzion field
school, the organisation is severely constrained in
moving beyond one-off activities due to the lack of
willingness on behalf of other organisations and local
Palestinian populations to work with settlers. A
member of the field school claimed that despite the
fact that organisations like EcoPeace, SPNI and INPA
are working on the same issues, these institutions
‘‘don’t want to work with us exactly…cause we work
at Gush Etzion’’. He added that they ‘‘don’t really like
us because we live there’’ and that ‘‘they look at us like
righters’’ (Interview, 25th November, 2014).
In both case studies, it must also be noted that most
of the ‘cooperation’ activities were not actually
conducted together. For example, whilst, indeed, there
were joint meetings, tours, tree planting events etc.
betweenWadi Fukin and Tzur Hadassah activists over
the separation barrier, it was really Ecopeace, sup-
ported by Tzur Hadassah activists, who worked on the
subsequent legal challenge. Wadi Fukin had its own
case submitted independently. In the Kfar Etzion field
school-Palestinian case, the joint activities have been
even more limited. This is illustrated for instance by
Mandel (2010) who stated that ‘‘the activities never
achieved the magnitude of a joint march’’ (para 3) and
by Rinat (2014) who wrote that ‘‘[t]he Kfar Etzion
field school has cooperated with the Palestinians for
years, albeit with limited success’’ (para 4). In fact, in
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the second case study, the cooperation has largely
been characterised by two separate campaigns oper-
ating on the common goal of preventing the separation
barrier and its destruction of the landscape, and with
very little interaction between the two. In fact, even
when the field school has attempted to get the
Palestinians to undertake joint actions with them, they
have been met with reluctance. One example was the
attempts by Yaron Rosenthal to get residents of
Walaje to join them in a march against the separation
barrier in the area. Yaron approached the founder of
the Erez Shalom movement with the hope that he
could encourage the Palestinians to participate. How-
ever, residents of Walaje were reluctant: ‘‘The word-
ing of the invitation, they say, does not note them as
equal parties in the struggle. But the deeper problem
lies in the embedded suspicion of the settlers’ true
intentions’’ (Mandel 2010, para 5). In fact, the
suspicions are so deep that the ‘‘the residents of
Walajeh avoid creating any connection between the
two protests [their own and that of the Kfar Etzion field
school] and insist on distinguishing their resistance
from the settlers’’’. Again, the mistrust associated with
the dominant conflict discourses and their restrictions
on cooperative efforts are clearly visible.
Furthermore, a lot of the activities were charac-
terised by the Israeli activists in both case studies
approaching their authorities on behalf of their Pales-
tinian neighbours. A Tzur Hadassah resident outlined
the situation: ‘‘They are asking us for favours. They
understand that human rights is important for us and we
are happy to help them’’. She said that ‘‘if they [the
Palestinians] contact the authorities, no one will do
anything’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014). She said
that, as a result, the residents of Tzur Hadassah often
have to contact Beitar Illit, the Ministry of the
Environment etc. for their Palestinian neighbours.
Another Tzur Hadassah resident summed up the
situation by stating that ‘‘[t]hey [their Palestinian
partners] feel very powerless…and they are’’ (Inter-
view, 5th November, 2014). According to the Tzur
Hadassah activists, the fact that they ‘‘keep annoying
the different ministers’’ for their Palestinian neighbours
‘‘has a lot to do with the good relations’’ between the
two parties (Interview, 5th November, 2014). The same
scenario is also taking place in the second case study,
wherein local Palestinians approach the staff at the field
school to get them to contact the appropriate authorities
when they have problems. As a member of staff at the
field school explained, ‘‘Yaron [head of the field
school] has very good relationships with them [the
residents of Wadi Fukin]. They call him when they
have problems… [and he] goes to the newspapers, TV,
[etc.]’’. Hewent on to explain that the Palestinians can’t
go to the authorities themselves about their concerns
because ‘‘nobody listens to them’’ (Interview, 5th
November, 2014). A member of staff at EcoPeace,
when asked about the power imbalance inherent in such
activities, acknowledged its implications but claimed
that ‘‘in order to get the end result…sometimes you
have toworkwith the system’’. Shewent on to state that
‘‘mutual benefits were always in the forefront and in the
background’’ (Interview, 5th November, 2014). Obvi-
ously, the cooperating actors in the two case studies are
constrained by the political context and it is impossible
for them to completely change the unequal system
within which they are embedded. However, such
power-disparities, should the more powerful parties
decide to wield ideational power (coercive and bar-
gaining power) in their leadership of activities, could
induce willing compliance of the less powerful in
meeting the more powerful’s interests (Mirumachi and
Allan 2007). However, in these case studies the Israeli
parties do not appear to have negative intentions. In
fact, this represents an example of how the more
powerful actors (the Israeli actors) can actually use
their relative power advantage to benefit the weaker
parties (e.g. see Casca˜o and Zeitoun 2010). However,
these Israelis are weaker in power relative to the Israeli
decision-makers they wish to challenge. Therefore,
instigating change still ultimately depends upon the
latter. Nevertheless, it is argued here that by simply
mirroring the structural and power inequalities inherent
in the broader society, the two case studies have
significantly reduced their potential for peacebuilding,
broader forms of cooperation, and sustaining long-term
relationships. For example, it is this disparity inherent
in the nature of the activities that is largely responsible
for the persistent suspicion and distrust held by the
Palestinian actors. One Tzur Hadassah resident
summed this up by stating: ‘‘we [the Israel participants]
have the power….It’s easier for us to trust them’’
(Interview, 5th November, 2014).
Now that all of the four necessary factors have been
explored, the case studies can now be placed on
Mirumachi’s (2007) cooperation intensity scale. The
five possible levels (growing in intensity respectively)
are: confrontation of the issue, ad hoc cooperation,
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technical cooperation, risk-adverting cooperation,
risk-averting cooperation and risk-taking cooperation.
Confrontation of the issue is where the issue is
acknowledged but no joint action is undertaken. In ad
hoc interaction, there is joint action but no shared
goals. Technical cooperation occurs where there is
shared goals but no joint action. In order for cooper-
ation intensity to be risk-averting, there needs to be
joint action, shared goals, and a belief that the other
party will do as expected. Risk-taking cooperation is
an ideal form wherein the parties enter into cooper-
ation without considering the costs and risks associ-
ated with doing so. The last two types are considered
high-intensity cooperation (Mirumachi and Allan
2007). Based on the above discussion and findings of
previous sections of the paper, it seems that the two
case studies could only be classed as being at the lower
end of this scale. Most of the activities involve one
side undertaking action alone (this includes where one
side takes action on behalf of the other). Therefore
most of the activities can be described as instances of
‘confrontation of the issue’ or ‘technical cooperation’.
There were a few activities that were conducted
together- particularly in case study one. If it is claimed
that the goals are not really aligned (given the noted
variance in motives for preserving the environment),
these few activities of joint action can be considered as
‘ad hoc’ cooperation. If it is accepted that there is a
common broad goal (despite the differing motivations
for pursuing that goal), some of these joint-action
activities could be said to be approaching ‘risk-
averting cooperation’. However, these few activities
have collapsed in case study one following the
expansion of Tzur Hadassah. In case study two, these
instances of joint action have been rare and when they
do occur it has really been one Palestinian family who
have engaged with the settlers. All considered, the
cooperation intensity of the two case studies can be
considered low. In order to move towards high
intensity cooperation (risk-averting and risk-taking
cooperation), the issues of fear, suspicion and mistrust
would need to be addressed and the principles of
‘mutual benefits’ and ‘do no harm’ upheld.
Conclusion
After exploring the nature of cooperation in the two
greater Bethlehem case studies, the findings reaffirm
the notion that we should not be overly optimistic at
the first signs of cooperation. The reality was found to
be more complex and less positive than depicted in
most media sources. It would appear that the actors’
intentions are genuine, with both the Israeli and
Palestinian parties sharing the same broad common
goal of preserving the environment (even though the
motivations for wishing to do so might be different).
Most parties also seem to possess a mutual respect for
the rights of the other. However, the cooperative
activities mirror the structural inequalities and power
disparities, as well as the deeply engrained conflict
discourses, fears, and intragroup pressures and expec-
tations inherent in Israeli–Palestinian society as a
whole. These factors have led to cooperation that is
limited, unstable and prone to collapse. These findings
remind us that such cooperative interactions do not
occur in a vacuum but are influenced by their broader
socio-political context, in this case, a protracted
ethnonational conflict. This supports Mirumachi and
Allan’s (2007) assertion that the Israeli–Palestinian
case is one where the broader political climate has a
great impact on water relations. It also supports
Elhance’s (2000) assertion that where there is larger
societal friction, hydro/environmental politics can
become entwined with domestic politics, making it
difficult to develop cooperation. Calls for a multi-
tiered approach to examining environmental cooper-
ation are also supported by these findings (e.g. Kistin
2007), as are those for context specific analysis (e.g.
Elhance 2000).
Also important to note is that whilst the local
cooperative efforts often mirror the larger context
and structures of which they are a part, the local
scale can also offer opportunities that are not
available at the larger scales. For example, the case
studies confirm that whilst there is an unwillingness
to cooperate at the state level in Israel/Palestine,
there are local actors willing to engage in environ-
mental cooperation (Coskun 2009). Some actors at
this scale possess counter-discourses which can be
used to begin to challenge the dominant conflict-
discourses if we can find ways to overcome the
barriers to cooperation (Fro¨hlich 2012). This reiter-
ates the need to escape from the ‘territorial trap’ and
state-centered focus that has characterised such
literature to date (Sneddon and Fox 2006). However,
the two cases have also shown that since the societal
conflict-discourses of fear and mistrust towards the
GeoJournal
123
other pervade the local sphere, local cooperative
efforts must ensure that they uphold the principles
of ‘do no harm’ and ‘mutual benefits’. Failure to do
so risks perpetuating and even deepening the
negative perceptions of the other.
On a broader level, the paper lends support to the
argument that it is only by taking a holistic approach to
the analysis of environmental cooperation that the
factors of complexity at play can be unpacked and the
true nature and limitations of the interactions illumi-
nated. This includes examination of the historical,
political, economic, cultural, and social elements in
river basins (Elhance 2000), as well as all of the factors
relating to the actors themselves (agendas, percep-
tions, power position, reputation, strategies etc.)
(Victor 2006; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). The
complexity factors at play in the two case studies
explored in this paper include: power-play strategiz-
ing, asymmetries in power and socio-political influ-
ence, conflict discourses, narratives and ideologies, re-
entry problems, issues of representativeness, a context
of ethno-nationalist conflict, and apparent variance in
motives. Future studies must therefore conduct
detailed multi-tiered examinations of the context and
the nature of cooperation (with all the complexity
factors that entails) in a multitude of settings so that we
can identify barriers and limitations, the identification
of which will allow us to take action for moving
towards more meaningful, equitable and ultimately
successful forms of environmental cooperation. This
will ensure that people across the globe do not fall
victim to ‘less pretty’ forms of environmental
cooperation.
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